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J. Mark Robinette* 
 
There is very little to report in Arkansas this year.  The 92nd 
General Assembly made no substantive changes to the law of oil and 
gas in Arkansas.  In addition, the federal courts produced no 
significant developments.1  In state court, there were two notable 
cases. 
The case of Arkansas Oil & Gas Comm’n v. Hurd, began as an 
examination of the Oil and Gas Commission’s authority regarding 
compulsory leasing and pooling but ended with a bizarre twist.   In the 
administrative proceeding, SWN Arkansas Production Company, 
LLC sought to show that the leases of two mineral owners were "self-
dealing, non-arm's length" transactions.2   These owners received a 
25% royalty under the alleged self-dealt leases, while SWN gave no 
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 1. Smith v. SEECO, 922 F.3d 398 (8th Cir. 2019) (deciding the only oil and gas 
case in the federal courts on procedural grounds with no special impact on the law 
of oil and gas). 
 2. Id. at 409. 
 3. Id. 
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Commission sided with SWN, and the mineral owners appealed to 
Pulaski County Circuit Court pursuant to the Arkansas Administrative 
Procedures Act.4   
During the appeal to the circuit court, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court issued the opinion of Board of Trustees of the University of 
Arkansas v. Andrews.  This opinion held that the State of Arkansas 
cannot waive its sovereign immunity via laws enacted by the General 
Assembly.5  The Commission moved to dismiss the appeal utilizing 
Andrews to argue that being named a defendant in circuit court under 
the Arkansas Administrative Procedures Act violated the sovereign 
immunity doctrine.6  The Circuit Court of Pulaski County granted the 
Commission’s motion to dismiss, but not before holding that the lack 
of a right of review of administrative action in light of the Andrews 
decision rendered the entire Arkansas Administrative Procedures Act 
unconstitutional.7 
The Arkansas Supreme Court took the Commission’s appeal 
from the circuit court.8  Using a clever pivot on the issue of the 
Commission’s status as a party to the appeal to circuit court, the Court 
found that the Commission was not a defendant in the action.  Instead, 
the Commission was “akin to a trial court in an appellate proceeding; 
it has no vested interest in the outcome of the appeal other than 
whether its decision is upheld.”9  As a result, the Court abrogated and 
remanded the circuit court’s opinion.10  
The decision was a sensible compromise allowing the 
continuing operation of the Oil & Gas Commission.  If the trial court’s 
 
 4. Id. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72- A-2(j)(1)(c) (2019) (requiring an applicant 
seeking force pooling to provide information on the highest bonus and royalty 
known in the unit); ARK. CODE ANN. §15-72-304(b)(4) (explaining this is the basis 
under which an unleased mineral owner who fails to affirmatively elect to participate 
in the unit gets compensated for transfer of his rights under); Walls v. Arkansas Oil 
& Gas Comm’n, 390 S.W.3d 88 (Ark. 2012) (explaining information about the 
“highest” bonus and royalty is only an evidentiary requirement, then the information 
is then subject to “reasonable consideration and a reasonable basis” and is not “fair 
market value.” As such, some mineral owners subject to force pooling react by 
entering into leases with entities they own at higher terms than those proposed by 
the applicant.  This case is a test of how far mineral owners who self-deal may go). 
 5. Ark. Oil and Gas Comm’n v. Hurd, 564 S.W.3d 248, 250 (Ark. 2018) 
(explaining the Arkansas Constitution provides that “[t]he State of Arkansas shall 
never be made a defendant in any of her courts”); ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 20. 
 6. Board of Trustees v. Andrews, 535 S.W.3d 616, 622–23 (Ark. 2018). 
 7. Arkansas Oil and Gas Comm’n, 564 S.W.3d at 250–51. 
 8. See id. at 253. 
 9. Id. at 255. 
 10. Id. 
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decision had stood, it would practically end the functionality of all 
state administrative agencies.  In addition, the trial court opinion 
would require an amendment of the Arkansas Constitution.  The 
language of the Constitution is very clear, and it was the basis of the 
Andrews decision.  Unfortunately, the merits of the underlying issue 
in the Hurd case are not yet reported, though an appeal is pending. 
A class was successfully certified for thirty-six persons in a 
claim against a gas producer in Stephens Production Company v. 
Mainer.  The trial court certified the class as those underpaid royalties 
on “proceeds” leases within a certain production unit in Franklin 
County, Arkansas.11  The gas producer’s resistance to the class action 
certification was principally the size of the class.12   In a prior case 
cited by the producer, a class of seventeen persons failed to meet the 
numerosity requirement of Arkansas’s Rule Civil Procedure 23 
regarding class actions.13  The Court reiterated that it has no bright-
line test on the exact number needed to satisfy the numerosity 
requirement and that “common sense” controls.14  Not elaborating on 
this standard of common sense, the Court instead noted there was no 
abuse of discretion by the trial court.15  More importantly, in a close 
case of whether or not there is numerosity, erring on the side of 
certification is favored by the Court because it is possible to decertify 
the class at a later date.16   
Justices Wood, Kemp, and Womack dissented from the 
majority’s opinion.17  The thrust of the dissent was that there were no 
findings by the trial court on “geographic dispersion of class members, 
the size of individual claims, the financial resources of the class 
members, or the ability of claimants to institute individual suits.”18  
Without these findings, the dissent would have found that the trial 
court abused its discretion.19   
Stephens Production Company seems to allow a presumption 
that lessors in a production unit under a common lessor are a viable 
class of plaintiffs.  If so, this may result in a new round of litigation of 
 
 11. Stephens Prod. Co. v. Mainer, 571 S.W.3d 905, 907 (Ark. 2019). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 908. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. at 910. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.  
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“micro” class actions.  One could certainly imagine the use of this 
tactic in both royalty disputes within units and implied covenant cases 
within units in Arkansas. 
